Napoleon at Wagram, 1809

Brom Kim, 1998

Napoleon at Wagram, by Horace Vernet

The year 1809 was a watershed for modern warfare. Until this point, Napoleon Bonaparte had proven himself master of Europe by defeating any army that opposed him. 1809, however would hold some unpleasant surprises for the Emperor. Chastened by an embarrassing and costly series of defeats, the Allies of 1809 had been looking to France for ways of improving their Armed Forces. This was a trend that would continue for a long time to come. As a result, the armies of 1809 were much better balanced than they had been before. This more balanced contest would give Napoleon his first major defeat, but would also allow the Emperor to demonstrate his mastery of the operational art. Napoleon's ability to cede the first move, and adapt to the treachery of the Russians without missing a beat proved that Bonaparte's earlier victories were based on a lot more than better logistics or organization. Still, the tide was turning. The campaigns of 1809 marked the beginning of a trend in war where Ēlan and generalship might count for much, but grim attrition was to become, for a time, master of all.

Napoleon's strategies for the 1809 campaigns were based on the assumption that France's Russian allies would support him on the Western front. Unknown to Napoleon however, his Grand Chamberlain Talleyrand betrayed him by passing secret information to Tsar Alexander. In December of 1808, the Russians communicated to the Austrians that they would offer only token support to Napoleon as a pretense of honoring the treaty of Tilsit. Lack of a western ally would mean that the Emperor would have to chase the Austrians all the way to Vienna before he could finally win his decisive victory at Wagram.

Nor were the armies that Napoleon would face in the campaigns of 1809 the same antiquated organizations that he had so adroitly destroyed in previous years. Austria had been reforming her military forces in the period between 1806 in 1809. She was able to muster 594,216 men with 742 field guns in 108 batteries. This was a very impressive amount of man- and firepower for the time. Additionally, the Austrian army had taken steps to begin dividing itself into corps. France's enemies began to realize that the tactics of the 18th-century were a distinctive liability when fighting the relatively modern French army. Although this new system of organization came too late, it would prevent Napoleon from destroying the Austrian army in a single great battle as at Austerlitz.

Although most of Europe had supposedly been 'conquered' by Napoleon Austria was hardly alone in chafing at French rule. For support in the upcoming war, Austria solicited the help of Prussia and Great Britain. In October of 1808 the Prussians secretly promised to help the Austrians, promising 80,000 troops for joint defense along the Main river in Central Germany. Additionally, Great Britain offered support in the form of her considerable wealth. The British financial support included 750,000 pounds of specie and 4 million pounds in bills of exchange. Additionally Great Britain promised to send her elite expeditionary force to the north German coast.

Also acting in favor of the Allies was Napoleon's Spanish Ulcer. Although, by the beginning of 1809 the British were on the run in the peninsula and Moore killed in a rear guard action, they still held Portugal, and the guerrilla war continued, seriously draining French manpower and morale. With a large portion of French forces needed to quell unrest in the Peninsula, the Allies expected Napoleon to only be able to muster 200,000 troops for the German theatre of operations. Austria alone could commit 300,000. In terms of manpower at least, the balance seemed tipped towards the allies.

But Napoleon had been considering the possibility of war with Austria since the spring of 1808. Considerable numbers of Conscripts were called up in France during 1808. Additional reinforcements were gathered from the French occupied German states of Bavaria, Wurtemburg, Baden, Saxony, and Westphalia. 20,000 Polish troops were also brought from the Duchy of Warsaw. So Napoleon had a substantial amount of manpower available, and no small advantage was conferred by the experience of his winning veteran soldiers.

French forces had been fighting according to modern organization as highly effective combined arms units for quite some time now, as compared to the Austrians last minute switch to the corps system. Although Napoleon's armies suffered from the Emperor's tendency toward nepotism and his inability to cultivate more commanders in the mid ranks, in 1809 he could still depend on Davout, Massena, and Lannes and many other excellent officers in the lower ranks. Success in fighting a campaign with widely dispersed units as in 1809 would depend on the ability of subordinate commanders to act competently and independently.

Napoleon's strategy him for the war in 1809 was flexible and open-ended. Preferring that peace be maintained, the Emperor wanted to give Austria no provocation. If hostilities became necessary, the Russian alliance as defined in the terms of the treaty of Tilsit, would only be triggered by Austrian aggression. So Napoleon deployed in his forces in a great diamond formation within mutually supporting distance so as to be able to meet and Austrian offensive on either the north or south side of the Danube River. The corps that made contact to with the enemy would fix him, while the others maneuvered into an advantageous position. Marshall Berthier was directed to relay the Emperor's commands such as were transmitted via telegraph and mounted courier from Paris.

Given the continent wide nature of the 1809 campaigns, Napoleon could not directly command all of the French forces. Command in the Italian peninsula was delegated to Napoleons Viceroy and son-in-law Prince Eugene de Beauharnais. Because Eugene's experience consisted of small unit command and administration at the time, Napoleon corresponded frequently with the Viceroy, instructing him on the Emperor's method of warfare, and specifics of how to conduct the Italian campaign.

Eugene was to pin the Arch Duke John's army at a defensive line on the Adige River. Napoleon instructed Eugene on various contingencies depending on how the Austrians might attack. While Eugene may have been a competent cavalry commander, he was hardly up to the job of commanding the French army in Italy at the outset. Eager to prove himself, Eugene further exacerbated the situation by asking the emperor not to send any of his marshalls to Italy:

I desire that Your Majesty does not stand here any of the marshals. I feel strong enough to manage the army in such a way that would please you…. I would prefer to deal directly with my divisional generals. I know them all and would work better with them. They are all very good and do not have the pretensions are the marshals.

Napoleon agreed. The marshalls were busy enough in Spain and Germany. The Emperor hoped that correspondence with Eugene would be enough to secure victory in Italy. Eugene strengthened his army with by drafting conscripts in France and Italy, and three corps were formed under Macdonald, Grenier, and Baraguey d'Hilliers.

When war arrived in the German front on April 9, 1809, there was no formal declaration from the Austrian consulate. This took the French temporarily by surprise. Berthier, following the Emperor's orders to the letter without taking pains to interpret them received some messages out of order, and contrary to the Emperor's intentions, ordered Davout to remain at Ratisbon, and Lefebvre to halt on the Isar River. Napoleon had intended that when contact was made, the corps would pull back a little to allow time to concentrate. A concerned Emperor dashed from Paris on April 13th to take personal command of the situation.

The Austrians had advanced on a broad front between Salzburg and Passau. Had they moved faster, they might have been able to take advantage of Berthier's incompetence at command and destroy the French corers that had been left isolated in advanced positions. But the Austrians had not gone far enough in their reforms. Their reluctance to forage, and the excess baggage of the officers slowed their advance to 10 miles a day as they moved from their initial crossing at the Inn River to their destination at the Isar. The Austrians were successful in securing crossings at Landshut, but the initiative was lost. Napoleon now knew where the Austrians were, and Lefebvre's isolated corps managed to escape north toward the Danube and the main French concentration.

Napoleons main forces were now concentrating along the Danube. At this time, Massena was steadily advancing from the West toward Landshut to cut Austrian communications over the Isar as Napoleon's main force engaged what he thought was the main Austrian army in the center. Believing he had destroyed the main Austrian army in an engagement at Abensberg, Napoleon began to shift his forces to the south. Arch Duke Charles meanwhile, was shifting his strength northward towards Ratisbon to finish the isolated French forces there.

When Napoleon received word from a very concerned Davout that the latter was facing the main Austrian army in the North, Napoleon immediately reverse the direction of his 'pursuit'. Davout and Lefebvre managed, but barely, to hold out for two days, saved as the main French force returned from the South to threaten Charles' left flank. Charles forces were defeated and sent to fleeing north of the Danube or west along its southern bank. Napoleon might have executed a successful pursuit, but by this time he was receiving reports of major problems from Eugene.

Eugene had not counted on a revolt in the Tyrol. A prearranged revolt in the Alps to Eugene's North ruined and all the careful planning that had gone on between the young Viceroy and the Emperor. Believing himself threatened on two fronts, Eugene attempted a Napoleonic strategy of attacking and, hopefully destroying each of the Austrian forces in turn. Unfortunately Eugene was inexperienced, and was unable to successfully succeed in the manner of his teacher. Facing defeat, Eugene retreated to the Adige defensive line to regroup. Just as Napoleon was ready to relieve him of command, Eugene regained his nerve and counterattacked the Austrians, beating them at Piave. Two days after he had received Napoleon's letter relieving him of command, Eugene had the Arch Duke John on the run Westward toward Vienna.

Napoleon, meanwhile was quite concerned about Eugene's ability to fix the arch Duke John's forces in Italy, let alone survive. Concerned for his own Right, Napoleon did not pursue the bulk of Charles forces north of the Danube, but instead marched his main force toward Vienna using the Danube as a screen. This movement on interior lines would keep the two Austrian armies separate. Napoleon hoped that by threatening Vienna, the Austrian emperor would sue for peace.

The two main armies eventually met just west of Vienna near the towns of Aspern and Essling on May the 21st, 1809. Napoleon chose not to cross the Danube at any of the partially destroyed bridges as they were well guarded by the Austrians. Instead he chose to build pontoon bridges across near Lobau Island. This was to be the site of the Emperor's first major defeat and would cost him dearly. Thinking that the all he had to do was cross the river and destroy the Arch Duke Charles' army, both of whom the Emperor thought little of, Napoleon sent two of his best commanders. Essling was to be held by Marshall Lannes, while Massena would hold Aspern. These sturdy hamlets would form a defensive base of operations while the bulk of the French forces crossed the Danube. But the emperor failed to take into account the defensive firepower of the massed Austrian guns.

In a seesawing two day battle that yielded little more than casualties, the French and Austrians slugged it out. The situation for Napoleon was worsened by the repeated destruction of his pontoon bridges by debris the Austrians had floated down river. The Emperor lost approximately 20,000 to 30,000 men, and Marshall Lannes, one of his best commanders, and only friends was mortally wounded. At 3:30 AM on May 23rd, Massena, commanding the French rearguard had crossed the pontoon bridge back across the Danube. Although Charles had hardly defeated Napoleon by any great act of genius, the tremendous firepower of his modernized army closed the gap.

By June Eugene was on his way to Vienna, having chased the Austrians from Italy. Apparently Eugene had learned something from his master, and proved himself capable in the art of mountain warfare that Napoleon had learned from Bourcet. The Emperor, smarting from his defeat at Aspern-Essling, instructed Eugene to bring as many captured Austrian guns with him as possible. Napoleon intended to wait for Eugene before he crossed the Danube again. The next time he faced the arch Duke Charles, Napoleon intended not to be outgunned or outnumbered.

Napoleon would not attack across the Danube again until 5 July, 1809, which gave him plenty of time to plan and prepare. A stockade of pile driven logs was set in the Danube upstream of Lobau in order to protect the pontoon bridges. The Emperor began his attack with a ruse, moving a large number of troops to the North shore of Lobau, while the actual assault took place on the East shore. The powerful battery that Napoleon had placed on Lobau covered the assault by battering the Austrian defenses between Aspern and Essling.

The battle of Wagram took place in a vast area encompassing 25 square miles. The Austrian army was deployed in a huge arc 12 miles long running from the Bisamberg Heights and eastward along a low ridge behind the Russbach stream. Realizing that Arch Duke Charles had dispersed his troops to widely, Napoleon intended a coordinated attack at three points along the ridge behind the Russbach. In reality, the planned assault did not take place until the evening, and failed because the French advance was uncoordinated and the Austrian artillery was devastating. The understated Cognet repaeatedly mentions Austrian firepower in his account of the battle.

The first day of the battle of Wagram ended in a draw. Napoleon had successfully brought his armies across the Danube, and reinforcements continued to come in through the night. Arch Duke Charles, having decided not to face the French batteries on the Lobau was still secure on the heights, and expected arched Duke John's army to reinforce him the following day.

The second day, July 6, of the battle of Wagram involved flanking assaults at both extremes of the battle area. While Napoleon's forces assaulted the Russbach Heights from his center and right, an Austrian attack by Lichtenstein and Kollowrat threatened the French left. When this assault was stopped by the Army of Italy, Massena, and massed artillery from the French reserves, Napoleon moved in for the kill. Davout began to roll up the Austrian left flank under Rosenberg, meanwhile MacDonald attacked the center in a huge boxlike formation.

By the mid-afternoon, Eugene had taken Wagram, MacDonald had taken Sussenbrunn with extensive help from the reserve, and Rosenberg was in retreat. Although the arch Duke John with 13,000 troops neared the battlefield at 4 PM, he realized that the battle was over and withdrew to the east. Napoleon had won, but Wagram had been a terrible battle and one of the largest that Europe would see for the rest of the 19th-century. French casualties totaled 37,568 including five generals, and many other officers. Austrian losses totaled 41,750.

Napoleon won at Wagram, but this was clearly no Austerlitz. It may be that Jomini referrs so often to Wagram for the same reason Guderian spends so much time discussing the Western Front of 1917-1918: because it presents major challenges to the maneuver based system of war that Jomini deduced from Napoleons impressive early victories. Throughout the campaign of 1809, Napoleon consistently defeats his opponents, using all the 'principles of war' that Jomini teases from the Napoleonic era. But a neat, war-ending climactic battle eludes the Emperor. Clausewitz' seemingly vague, organic Vom Kriege ends up being a lot more descriptive of modern war than Jomini's mechanistic ideas.

The Austrian army, although often defeated was not destroyed by any of the battles in 1809. Charles, no military genius had managed to soundly defeat the emperor once, and give Bonaparte a serious run for his money the second time. These were lessons that would not go unnoticed by the Allies. Clearly the nature of warfare was changing. The Austrian army, and to some extent Austria had reorganized itself along French lines. In a way, Revolutionary France's and Bonaparte's ultimate victory was an indirect one. The monarchies of old Europe had to become more democratic and less isolationist in order to face Napoleon. Nationalism, with or without a monarch, was becoming a necessity for survival in the 19th century.